Mechanism Design with Limited Information: The Case of Nonlinear Pricing by Bergemann, Dirk et al.
Yale University 
EliScholar – A Digital Platform for Scholarly Publishing at Yale 
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers Cowles Foundation 
11-1-2010 





Edmund M. Yeh 
Follow this and additional works at: https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/cowles-discussion-paper-series 
 Part of the Economics Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Bergemann, Dirk; Shen, Ji; Xu, Yun; and Yeh, Edmund M., "Mechanism Design with Limited Information: 
The Case of Nonlinear Pricing" (2010). Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers. 2116. 
https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/cowles-discussion-paper-series/2116 
This Discussion Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Cowles Foundation at EliScholar – A 
Digital Platform for Scholarly Publishing at Yale. It has been accepted for inclusion in Cowles Foundation 
Discussion Papers by an authorized administrator of EliScholar – A Digital Platform for Scholarly Publishing at 




MECHANISM DESIGN WITH LIMITED INFORMATION: 






























COWLES FOUNDATION FOR RESEARCH IN ECONOMICS 
YALE UNIVERSITY 
Box 208281 
New Haven, Connecticut 06520-8281 
 
 http://cowles.econ.yale.edu/  
Mechanism Design with Limited Information:
The Case of Nonlinear Pricing
Dirk Bergemanny Ji Shenz Yun Xux Edmund M. Yeh{
November 29, 2010
Abstract
We analyze the canonical nonlinear pricing model with limited information. A seller o¤ers
a menu with a nite number of choices to a continuum of buyers with a continuum of possible
valuations. By revealing an underlying connection to quantization theory, we derive the optimal
nite menu for the socially e¢ cient and the revenue-maximizing mechanism. In both cases, we
provide an estimate of the loss resulting from the usage of a nite n-class menu. We show that
the losses converge to zero at a rate proportional to 1=n2 as n becomes large.
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1 Introduction
The theory of mechanism design addresses a wide set of questions, ranging from the design of markets
and exchanges to the design of constitutions and political institutions. A central result in the theory
of mechanism design is the revelation principle which establishes that if an allocation can be
implemented incentive compatible in any mechanism, then it can be truthfully implemented in the
direct revelation mechanism, where every agent reports his private information, his type, truthfully.
Yet, when the private information (the type space) of the agents is large, then the direct revelation
mechanism requires the agents to have abundant capacity to communicate with the principal, and the
principal to have abundant capacity to process information. By contrast, the objective of this paper
is to study the performance of optimal mechanisms, when the agents can communicate only limited
information or equivalently when the principal can process only limited information. We pursue the
analysis in the context of a representative, but suitably tractable, mechanism design environment,
namely the canonical problem of nonlinear pricing. Here the principal, the seller, is o¤ering a variety
of choices to the agent, the buyer, who has private information about his willingness-to-pay for the
product.
The distinct point of view, relative to the seminal analysis by Mussa and Rosen (1978) and Maskin
and Riley (1984), resides in the fact that the information conveyed by the agents, and subsequently
the menu of possible choices o¤ered by the seller, is nite, rather than uncountable as in the earlier
analysis. The limits to information may arise for various, direct or indirect, reasons. On the demand
side, it may be too di¢ cult or too complex for the buyer to communicate his exact preferences and
resulting willingness to pay to the seller. On the supply side, it may be too time-consuming for the
seller to process the ne detail of the consumers preferences, or to identify the consumers preferences
across many goods with close attributes and only subtle di¤erences.
Our analysis adopts a linear-quadratic specication (analogous to that of Mussa and Rosen
(1978)) in which the consumers gross utility is the product of his willingness-to-pay (his type )
and the consumed quantity q of the product, whereas the cost of production cost is quadratic in the
quantity. For this important case, we reveal an interesting connection between the problem of optimal
nonlinear pricing with limited information to the problem of optimally quantizing a source signal
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by using a nite number of representation levels in information theory. In our setting, the socially
e¢ cient quantity q for a customer should be equated to his valuation  if a continuum of choices were
available. In the case where a nite number of choices are accessible q can take on only some values.
If we see  as the source signal and q as the representation level, then the total social welfare can be
written as the mean square error between the source signal and the representation signal. Given this,
the welfare maximization problem can be characterized by the Lloyd-Max optimality conditions, a
well-established result in the theory of quantization. Furthermore, we can extend the analysis to the
revenue maximization problem, after replacing the customers true valuation by the corresponding
virtual valuation, as dened by Myerson (1979). We estimate the welfare and revenue loss resulting
from the use of a nite n-class contract (relative to the continuum contract). In particular, we
characterize the rate of convergence for the welfare and revenue loss as a function of n. We examine
this problem rst for a given distribution on the customers type, and then over all possible type
distributions with nite support. We establish that the maximum welfare loss shrinks towards zero
at the rate proportional to 1=n2.
The role of limited information in mechanism design has recently attracted increased attention.
In a seminal paper, Wilson (1989) considers the impact of a nite number of priority classes on the
e¢ cient rationing of services. His analysis is less concerned with the optimal priority ranking for a
given nite class, and more with the approximation properties of the nite priority classes. McAfee
(2002) rephrases the priority rationing problem as a two-sided matching problem (between consumer
and services) and shows that already binary priority contract (coarse matching) can achieve at least
half of the social welfare that could be generated by a continuum of priorities. Hoppe, Moldovanu, and
Ozdenoren (2010) extend the matching analysis and explicitly considers monetary transfers between
the agents. In particular, they present lower bounds on the revenue which can be achieved with
specic, not necessarily optimal, binary contracts. By contrast, Madarasz and Prat (2010) suggest
a specic allocation, the prot-participationmechanism to establish approximation results, rather
than nite optimality results, in the nonlinear pricing environment. While the above contributions
are concerned with single agent environments, there have been a number of contributions to multi-
agent mechanisms, specically single-item auctions among many bidders. Blumrosen, Nisan, and
Segal (2007) consider the e¤ect of restricted communication in auctions with either two agents or
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binary messages for every agent. Kos (2010) generalizes the analysis by allowing for a nite number of
messages and agents. In turn, their equilibrium characterization in terms of partitions shares features
with the optimal information structures in auctions as derived by Bergemann and Pesendorfer (2007).
2 Model
We consider a monopolist facing a continuum of heterogeneous consumers. Each consumer is charac-
terized by a quasi-linear utility function: u (; q; t) = q t, where q is the quantity of his consumption
purchased from the monopolist,  describes his willingness-to-pay for the good (his "type"), and t is
the transfer paid by the agent. The monopoly seller o¤ers q units of products at a cost c (q) = 12q
2.
Consequently, the net utility of the buyer and seller are given by q   t (q) and t (q)   12q
2 respec-
tively, where t (q) is the transfer price that the buyer has to pay the seller for a quantity q of the
product. The specic parameterization of the utility function and the cost function is referred to
as the "linear-quadratic model" and has been extensively studied in the literature beginning with
Mussa and Rosen (1978). The prior distribution of  is given by F and has compact support on
R. Without loss of generality we normalize it to the unit interval [0; 1]. We denote the set of all
distribution on the unit interval by    [0; 1].
3 Welfare Maximization
We rst consider the social welfare maximization problem in the absence of private information by
the agent. That is, the willingness-to-pay of the buyer, his type, is publicly known. Moreover, as the
transfer t does not determine the level of the social surplus, but rather its distribution between buyer
and seller, it does not enter the social welfare problem. In the absence of communication constraints,











In the absence of private information, the optimal solution for every type  can be obtained pointwise,
and is given by q () = . In other words, the socially optimal menu M1 = fq () = g o¤ers a
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continuum of choices and assigns each consumer the quantity of the good which is equal to his




. Importantly, given its
linear-quadratic structure, the welfare maximizing problem is equivalent to minimizing the mean
square error (MSE), E[(   q)2]. We shall use this equivalent representation of the problem as we
now consider the problem with communication constraints.
By contrast, we seek to determine the optimal menu when we can o¤er only a nite number of
choices, and we denote byMn the set of contracts which o¤er at most a nite number n of quantity
choices. Henceforth, such a discretized contract Mn = fqkgnk=1 is called an n class contract or
n class menu. The socially optimal assignment rule then seeks to assign to each buyer with type  a
specic quantity q () with the property that the quantity q () represents an element in the n class









subject to fq ()g1=0 2Mn. (2)
Given that the valuation of the buyer is supermodular, i.e. @2u (; q) =@@q > 0, it follows that
the optimal assignment of types to quantities has a partitional structure. Let fAk = [k 1; k)gnk=1
represent a partition of the set of consumer types where 0 = 0 <    < k 1 < k <    < n = 1. A
consumer with type  2 Ak will be assigned q () = qk, and the socially optimal menuMn = fqkg
n
k=0
is increasing in k, so that q1 < q

2 <    < qk. Now, given the relationship to the mean square error
problem discussed above, if we view  as the source signal and qk as the representation points of
 on the quantization intervals Ak = [k 1; k), then the solution to the social welfare maximizing
contract is given by the n-level quantization problem, where both the quantization intervals Ak and







, subject to fq ()g1=0 2Mn: (3)
Hence, the optimal solution must satisfy the Lloyd-Max optimality conditions, see Lloyd (1982) and
Max (1960).


















; k = 0; : : : ; n. (4)
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, must be the conditional mean
for  given that  falls in the interval Ak and 

k, which separates two neighboring intervals A

k and




k+1. One can observe immediately that q

k is
actually determined by the rst-order condition with respect to (3) because MSEn in (3) is convex
in qk when taking k and k+1 as given. Similarly, k is determined by the rst-order condition when
qk and qk+1 are given because MSEn in (3) is convex in k when taking qk and qk+1 as given. For
certain family of distributions (e.g., uniform distribution and some discrete distributions) we can
obtain closed-form solutions from the Lloyd-Max optimality conditions. We are interested in the
relative performance of nite contracts and evaluate the di¤erence between SW 1 and SW

n .
Denition 1 Given any F 2 , the welfare loss of an n-class contract compared with the optimal
continuous contract is dened by L (F ;n)  SW 1   SW n .
It is easy to see that the lower bound over all densities is zero, i.e. infF2 L (F ;n) = 0. This can




= 1n for k = 1; :::; n . Our main task is to
provide an upper bound over all distributions, i.e., the worst-case scenario from the point of view of
total social welfare.
Denition 2 The maximum welfare loss of an n-class contract over all F 2  is given by L (n) 
supF2 L (F ;n) :
We rst consider a simple example, and show in detail how to use the Lloyd-Max conditions to
obtain the optimal discretized contract and measure the resulting welfare loss.
Example 1 Suppose that  is uniformly distributed over [0; 1]. The optimization problem (2) has a






n , k = 0; 1; : : : ; n. The expected social welfare





and the welfare loss is SW 1   SW n = 124n2 :
In this example, the cuto¤ points are uniformly distributed, which is due to the fact that the
underlying distribution of  is uniform. In addition, the convergence rate of the welfare loss induced
by discretized contracts is of the order 1=n2. Next, we provide a general estimate of the convergence
rate of the welfare loss induced by discretized contracts as the number of classes tends to innity. A
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direct approach to calculate the welfare loss for general distributions would require the explicit form
of the optimal quantizer, determined by the Lloyd-Max conditions. But an explicit characterization
of the optimal quantizer is not known, and thus we pursue an indirect approach to obtain a bound


























Given the necessary conditions of Proposition 1, it will su¢ ce to conne our attention to the set of
nite menusMn with the property that, given a distribution F 2 , the menu Mn = fqkg
n
k=1 can
be generated by a nite partition Ak through qk = E (j 2 Ak) ; k = 1; : : : ; n, so that Mn is the








(F (k)  F (k 1)) var (j 2 Ak) : (6)
We can write L (F ;n) and L (n), using (5) and (6) as follows:
L (F ;n) = inf
Mn2Mn






(F (k)  F (k 1)) var (j 2 Ak) ; (7)
and consequently:








(F (k)  F (k 1)) var (j 2 Ak) : (8)
It is then central to estimate the variance of  conditional on the interval Ak to provide an upper
bound on L (n).
Proposition 2 For F 2 , and any n  1, L (F ;n)  1
8n2
.
Proof. For any given F 2 , let Mn be dened by 0k = k=n, q0k = E [(j 2 [k 1; k))] ;

















































It then follows that:

















which concludes the proof.
By considering the uniform distribution of Example 1, we can in fact show that the maximum
welfare loss is bounded both above and below by 1=n2 (up to some constant).
Proposition 3 For any n  1, 1
24n2
 L (n)  1
8n2






Similar to us, Wilson (1989) establishes that a nite priority ranking of order n induces a welfare
loss of order 1=n2. His method of proof is di¤erent from ours, in that it does not use quantiza-
tion explicitly, and in that for the limit results he proposes uniform quantization of the relevant
distribution.
4 Revenue Maximization
We now analyze the problem of revenue maximization with limited information. In contrast to the
social welfare maximizing problem, the seller wishes to maximizes his expected net revenue. The
expected net revenue is the di¤erence between the gross revenue that he receives from the buyer
minus the cost of providing the demanded quantity. The contract o¤ered by the principal now has to
satisfy two sets of constraints, namely the participation constraint, q ()  t ()  0, for all  2 [0; 1],








, of the buyer for all ; 0 2 [0; 1]. The
participation constraint guarantees that the buyer receives a nonnegative net utility from his choice,
and the incentive constraints account for the fact that the type  is private information to the buyer,
and hence the revelation of the information is required to be incentive compatible. The current
problem is then identical to the seminal analysis by Mussa and Rosen (1978) and Maskin and Riley
(1984) with one important exception: the buyer can only access a nite number of choices due to
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the limited communication with the seller. Now, a menu of quantity-price bundles is designed by
the monopolistic seller to extract as much prot as possible.
The revenue maximization problem, nding the optimal solution for the allocation q () and
the transfer t () simultaneously, then appears to be rather distinct from the welfare maximization
problem, which only involved the allocation q (). However, we can use the above incentive constraints
to eliminate the transfers and rewrite the problem in terms of the allocation alone. This insight
appeared prominently in the analysis of revenue maximizing auction in Myerson (1979). He showed
that the revenue maximization problem can be transformed into a welfare maximization problem
(without incentive constraints) as long as we replace the true valuation  of the buyer with the
corresponding virtual valuation:
̂   () =    1  F ()
f ()
: (9)
The virtual valuation is always below the true valuation, and the inverse of the hazard rate (1  F ()) =f ()
accounts for the information rent, the cost of the private information, as perceived by the principal
in the optimal mechanism. We shall follow Myerson (1979) and impose the regularity condition that
 () is strictly increasing in . With this standard transformation of the problem, the expected










The resulting optimal contract exhibits q () = max f () ; 0g. Now, in the world with limited
information, the seller can only o¤er a nite menu f(qk; tk); k = 1; : : : ; ng to the buyer. After rewriting
the revenue maximizing problem in terms of the virtual utility, we can omit the dependence on the










We denote the distribution function and density function of ̂ by G and g, respectively. We have
F (x) = Pr (  x) = Pr(̂   (x)) = G ( (x)), and thus f (x) = g ( (x)) 0 (x). Using the
insights of the previous section, we observe that maximizing the sellers revenue is equivalent to
minimizing the mean square error E̂[(̂   q)
2], where the expectation is taking with respect to
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the new random variable b. We then appeal to the appropriately modied Lloyd-Max optimality
conditions to characterize the revenue maximizing contract in the presence of information constraints:

























 k = 1; : : : ; n: (13)
Similar to the social welfare problem, we wish to evaluate the upper bound of 1   n across
all possible distribution functions F 2 . To this end, we dene the revenue loss induced by an
n-class contract compared with the optimal continuous contract, given a distribution F 2 , as
 (F ;n)  1 n and the maximum revenue loss induced by an n-class contract across all F 2 
as  (n)  supF2  (F ;n). The example of the uniform distribution is again illustrative before
turning to the general analysis.
Example 2 Suppose that  is uniformly distributed over [0; 1]. The optimization problem (11) has










and revenue loss is 1  n = 112(2n+1)2 :
It follows that the convergence rate of the revenue loss induced by discretized contracts is also
of the order 1=n2. We nd that the seller tends to serve fewer buyers as compared to the case when
a continuous contract is used. This property holds for general distributions as the sellers ability of
extracting revenue is limited. To compensate, the seller reduces the service coverage to pursue higher
marginal revenues. We now provide the convergence rate of the revenue loss induced by discretized

























The rst term in the square bracket captures the revenue loss by reducing the service coverage. The
second term in the square bracket and L (F ;n) in (7) are very much alike. One can immediately
get this term by replacing  by ̂ and F by G in L (F ;n). We can then adapt Proposition 2 to the
current environment.
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Proposition 5 For any F 2 , and any n  1,  (f ;n)  1=8n2.
The approximation result of the revenue maximizing problem is similar to the one of the social
welfare program. Likewise, we can use the above uniform example to establish a lower bound for the
revenue losses.
Proposition 6 For any n  1, 1=12 (2n+ 1)2   (n)  1=8n2, and hence  (n) = (1=n2).
5 Conclusion
We analyzed the role of limited information (or communication) in the context of the canonical
nonlinear pricing environment. By focusing on the simple linear-quadratic specication of the utility
and cost function, we were able to relate the limited information problem directly to the quantization
problem in information theory. This allowed us to explicitly derive the optimal mechanism, both
from a social e¢ ciency as well as from a revenue-maximizing point of view. In either case, our
analysis established that the worst welfare loss due to the limits of information, imposed by an
n-class contract, is of the order of 1=n2.
While the nonlinear pricing environment is of interest by itself, it also represents an elementary
instance of the general mechanism design environment. The simplicity of the nonlinear pricing
problem arises from the fact that it can viewed as a relationship between the principal, here the
seller, and a single agent, here the buyer, even in the presence of many buyers. The reason for the
simplicity is that the principal does not have to solve allocative externalities. By contrast, in auctions,
and other multi-agent allocation problems, the allocation (and hence the relevant information) with
respect to a given agent constrains and is constrained by the allocation to the other agents. For an
information-theoretic point of view, the ensuing multi-dimensionality would suggest that the methods
of vector quantization rather than the scalar quantization employed here, would become relevant.
Finally, the current analysis focused on limited information, and the ensuing problem of e¢ cient
source coding. But clearly, from an information-theoretic as well as economic viewpoint, it is natural
to augment the analysis to reliable communication between agent and principal over noisy channels,
the problem of channel coding, which we plan to address in future work.
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